New York Times Editorial: American Policy in China, Nov. 1945

The following is an editorial from the November 23, 1945 edition of the New York Times:

POLICY IN CHINA

On the basis of first-hand investigation on the spot, Under-Secretary of the Navy Gates sends back word that the situation in China is more serious and the danger of American involvement more acute than is generally realized. The Chinese civil war, which is rapidly passing from a war of words to a war of arms, is lighting new fires in the East which could set all Asia aflame again. It was Asia rather than Europe that was the immediate cause of America’s entry into the war, and American forces are now deployed throughout the Orient to help liquidate that war, a fact which puts them in the direct path of any new conflagration.

Under these circumstances it behooves the American Government and the American people to be very clear about the reasons which brought our forces to the Orient, and about the policy we wish to pursue there. The temptation is great to avoid possible danger simply by withdrawing all Americans from the danger zone, and old isolationist voices mingle with those of partisanship to urge such a step. But an examination of the fundamental causes, principles and methods of our policy in the Far East reveals how contradictory such an act would be to everything we have stood and fought for, and how futile and how dangerous such a course might be. For these causes, principles and methods may be summarized as follows:

1. The immediate issue over which the United States was plunged into war was American aid to China, which prevented Japan from conquering that great and friendly nation. America aided China for three reasons. The first was that we stand for a free world and that it is part of our policy to aid victims of aggression. The second was that we were specifically pledged by policy to defend the Open door in China, and by the Nine-Power Treaty to uphold the ‘sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.” The third and most fundamental reason, proceeding from the elemental instinct of self-preservation, was the realization that the domination of Asia by Japan would represent a mortal threat to the security of the United States.

2. American aid to China was extended to the only authority to which it could be extended –the Chinese National Government under Chiang Kai-shek, which all Chinese factions still recognize. This government was America’s ally during the war. It is now a charter member of the United Nations. To extend aid to any other authority in China would have been tantamount to fomenting rebellion against our ally and a flagrant intervention in China’s internal affairs. It is a curious but revealing sidelight on the situation that some of the same voices which properly demanded American aid to the Spanish Loyalists as the legitimate government of a neutral country now cry out against American aid to the legitimate government of our ally China.

3. Before Japan surrendered it was feared that American forces would have to fight the Japanese across China even after Japan herself had been conquered. The Japanese surrender fortunately made that great and perilous task unnecessary, but buy the surrender terms signed by all the Powers the Japanese armies in China have been ordered to surrender to Chiang Kai-sek, together with their arms and equipment. Because of the Communist revolt, Chiang Kai-sek has been delayed in carrying out his part of the surrender terms, and American forces are now aiding him in doing so. They are not there to fight the Chinese Communists, or to take part in a Chinese civil war, but to complete the Japanese surrender in conformity with obligations assumed by the American Government. In the performance of that duty they are entitled to understanding and support at home.

4. Whatever aid must still be extended to china must likewise go to the National Government, because any other course would undermine the United Nations. In this connection we must note that the other great Western Power in Asia, Soviet Russia, has pledged itself in the Russian-Chinese treaty to extend moral and military support to the National Government and no other.

5. The National Government of China is not yet as democratic as we should like it to be, but it offers more hope for liberty than the totalitarian regime of the Chinese Communists. The National Government is not only pledged to the establishment of democracy after a long period or tutelage; it is already beginning to extend democracy to the opposition. The Chinese Communists liquidate all opposition.

These are the principles and the practical considerations which have shaped, and should continue to shape, or policies.